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Abstract
Countries diﬀer substantially in how they deal with politicians that come from the public
sector. Most constitutions include incompatibility and ineligibility rules due to concerns
about conﬂicts of interest and the politicization of the public service. We study how these
rules aﬀect the attractiveness of parliamentary mandates for public servants and thus the
selection into politics. We compile a novel dataset that captures the fraction of public
servants in 71 national legislatures as well as the respective (in)compatibility regimes. On
average, there are 7 percentage points fewer public servants in parliaments where a strict
regime is in force. Supplementary evidence shows that the fraction of public servants in
parliament is positively correlated with government consumption as well as the absence of
corruption.
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11 Introduction
The identity of politicians matters for the political process and good government. This seems to
be self-evident as political control and the credibility of policy commitments in the democratic
process are limited. A careful selection of representatives is thus important to bring the outcomes
of the political process as closely as possible in line with citizens’ preferences when delegating
decision-making power. Obviously, the pool of people who consider pursuing a career in politics
is very heterogeneous with regard to ideals and interests, as people diﬀer in their gender, religious
orientation, and education.
We focus on the identity of politicians in terms of their professional backgrounds. This is impor-
tant, ﬁrstly, for determining the personal socio-economic conditions that inﬂuence an individual’s
decision to run for oﬃce. Secondly, it shapes their private economic interests inﬂuencing the
behavior once elected. Some of these interests are mediated by links to professional interest or
lobby groups. Thirdly, the specialist knowledge and expertise of certain professions are essential
in the parliamentary process.
In this paper, we concentrate on the single largest professional group present in most national
legislatures; i.e., the parliamentarians who are recruited from the public sector.1 This group
poses a major challenge when assessing political selection into national legislatures for two main
reasons. First, the instatement of politicians from the public sector presents two important
issues: interest representation and professional expertise. On the one hand, their double role
as agents in public service and as principals that supervise the executive branch in parliament
compromises the (personal) separation of powers. This generates a conﬂict of interest. On the
other hand, politicians with a public service background embody independence from speciﬁc
business interests. Furthermore they constitute a pool of people with ﬁrst-hand information on
public service issues and a revealed interest in these matters. Accordingly, where public servants
in parliament are made accountable to the electorate, their valuable expertise may even serve
as a check in the oversight process. Second, many countries have instituted speciﬁc rules for
this professional group which aim to prevent inherent conﬂicts of interest. These rules either
specify the incompatibility of a public sector position with a legislative mandate or even declare
public servants ineligible for candidacy. We hypothesize that these rules systematically change
the pool of available candidates and elected politicians.
We pursue three goals with our contribution. First, we aim to document the phenomenon of the
strong representation of public servants in national legislatures. We present a newly compiled
1In this group, we include all employees that receive public pay and have a work contract under public law;
i.e., for example, educational professions such as teachers or university professors, public servants or employees in
public administration or police oﬃcials.
2data set on the composition of the ﬁrst parliamentary chamber in 71 countries for the years 2000
to 2010. Interestingly, there are large diﬀerences in the fraction of members with a public sector
background. In the UK, for example, the fraction is 22.76%, while it is 49.16% in Denmark.
Second, we analyse the determinants of the variation in their representation. In particular, we
study legal provisions that primarily aim to inhibit conﬂicts of interest; i.e., the diﬀerent regimes
that deﬁne and deal with the (in)compatibility of public service employment with a mandate
in the legislature. Accordingly, data is collected on the (in)compatibility regimes for the same
71 countries. It is hypothesized that incompatibility provisions reduce the attractiveness of a
political mandate and are thus related to a lower fraction of public servants in parliament. Third,
an initial basis is provided to explore the consequences that a strong representation of public
servants in national parliaments has on the political process. We explore the relationship between
the political selection of public servants and corruption as well as the size of the government
sector.
As main results, we ﬁnd that the average fraction of politicians with a public sector background
is 31.41% in our sample. With regard to incompatibility rules, we observe six countries with
a compatibility regime, 23 countries with a soft incompatibility, and 37 countries with a strict
incompatibility regime. Five countries apply an ineligibility rule. The application of stricter
incompatibility rules (strict incompatibility or ineligibility), signifying higher opportunity costs
of a political mandate, is statistically related to a smaller fraction of public servants in parliament
by roughly seven percentage points. This diﬀerence is robust to a series of sensitivity checks
for potentially correlated economic and institutional conditions. The diﬀerence is even larger if
countries with a compatibility regime are compared to countries where ineligibility rules are in
force. Regarding the supplementary evidence for political outcomes, we ﬁnd that the fraction
of public servants in parliament is statistically signiﬁcantly correlated with a lower level of
corruption and a higher level of government consumption. While we consider these correlations
interesting as such, causal relationships may go either way. Two-stage estimations using the
incompatibility regime as an instrument lead to coeﬃcients for the political selection variable of
similar size but with larger standard errors.
Our study contributes to and beneﬁts from recent research on the economics of political selection
(see Fearon 1999, Brennan and Hamlin 2000, Besley 2005 and Mansbridge 2009 for reviews of
some general ideas).2 In particular, we want to contribute to an improved understanding of the
institutional determinants of the selection of people with diﬀerent characteristics into politics.
2There is ﬂourishing literature on political selection in economics that gained prominence with the so-called
citizen-candidate models of Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996). Recent contributions
include; e.g., the selection eﬀects of higher compensation for politicians (Caselli and Morelli 2004, Messner and
Pohlborn 2004, Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2009, and Ferraz and Finan 2009), of parties that strategically allocate
their candidates to contested districts (Galasso and Nannicini 2011), and of alternative electoral rules (Mattozzi
and Merlo 2010).
3Previous research is scarce and scattered. Research on the gender dimension highlights gen-
der quotas (see, e.g., Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo 2004 on political reservations in India) or the
diﬀerent selection eﬀects of alternative electoral rules (see Norris and Franklin 1997). Hetero-
geneity in the competence of politicians is often approximated by the level of formal education.
More educated politicians are observed as leaders in democracies than in autocracies (Besley
and Reynal-Querol 2009). Another closely related strand of literature deals with the profes-
sional background of politicians.3 For instance, Gehlbach et al. (2010) ﬁnd more businessmen
as governors in Russian provinces and republics where there is low media freedom and govern-
ment transparency. Rosenson (2006) observes that disclosure rules are assocoated with a lower
representation of businessmen and lawyers in U.S. state houses. Van Aaken and Voigt (2009)
ﬁnd no such eﬀect at the country level.4
With the focus on the institution of incompatibility as a fundamental facet of the separation
of powers principle, our study is also related to work pioneered by Persson et al. (1997) and
Persson and Tabellini (2005).
In an earlier study closely linked to the current analysis, Braendle and Stutzer (2010a) investigate
the representation of public servants in German state parliaments. Using time-series cross-
sectional analysis, they found that institutional restrictions in terms of incompatibility rules
substantially reduce the selection of public servants into parliament and that institutionally
granted privileges increase the fraction of public servants. We substantially extend this research
to capture a wider variation in (in)compatibility regimes in a cross-country perspective.
Section 2 presents the rationale for (in)compatibility rules from a historical perspective and
derives hypotheses regarding the representation of public servants in national parliaments. In
Section 3, we, ﬁrst, provide a detailed description of the compiled dataset. Second, we lay out
our econometric analysis and show the partial correlations between the institutional factors and
the political selection of public servants. Section 4 supplements the analysis with an explorative
study on the consequences of the political selection of public servants for political outcomes; i.e.,
perceived corruption and government consumption. Section 5 oﬀers concluding remarks.
3In political science, the professional background of politicians is discussed in the literature on elite research
and political recruitment (see, e.g., Norris 1997, Patzelt 1999, and Cotta and Best 2008).
4National leaders’ professions are also statistically related to policy choices. In a study for 72 countries over
33 years, former entrepreneurs were found to be more likely to implement market-liberalizing reforms (Dreher et
al. 2009).
42 The rationale and some history behind (in)compatibility
regimes
In a democracy, government functions are usually assigned to diﬀerent bodies. This separation
of powers is pursued in order to reduce conﬂicts of interest and prevent the abuse of sovereign
authority. Interestingly, the separation of powers principle is implemented rather diﬀerently
with regard to individual people being allowed to hold multiple oﬃces. One major constitutional
decision coping with the alleviation of inherent (intrapersonal) conﬂicts of interest is the degree
of compatibility of employment in the public sector with election to legislative assemblies.5
2.1 A short recapitulation of (in)compatibility regimes
Rules that declare employment in the public service incompatible with parliamentary mandates
have been justiﬁed for three main reasons.6
First, incompatibility rules should prevent legislative assemblies from being composed of persons
who are subject to government control due to their ties to the state or their economic dependence
on it. This rationale dates back to eighteenth-century Britain and has aimed at protecting the
independence of parliament from the strong inﬂuence of the crown. In the United Kingdom,
this concern is (still) reﬂected in the House of Commons Disqualiﬁcation Act of 1975. The latter
act constitutes the basis for the ineligibility rule that still holds today.7 A second motivation
for introducing incompatibility or even ineligibility provisions is the concern that the public
service will become politicized by allowing public servants to assume seats in parliament; where
the public service is supposed to be an institution above the political arena. The enactment of
tight restrictions on the political activity of public servants in the United States, for example, is
explained mainly by the desire to maintain the (party-)political neutrality of the public service.
These restrictions date back to the 19th century and were deﬁned in the Civil Service Act of
5Besides this major incompatibility, there are also restrictions for holding diﬀerent elected oﬃces. For example,
the logic of bicameralism implies the restriction of the simultaneous holding of a seat in the ﬁrst and second
chamber of a democracy. The same rationale applies to incompatibilities between diﬀerent federal levels (i.e.,
a mandate in the national parliament and in a regional assembly). Some European countries impose the same
rules to prohibit seats being held jointly in the European Parliament and the national assembly. Moreover,
incompatibilities of a ministerial oﬃce and parliamentary duties are the general rule in presidential regimes and
are a characteristic feature of them. They are, e.g., found in countries like Brazil, Portugal, the United States
and Switzerland.
6For a detailed description of the historical evolution of incompatibility rules and for discussions from a
comparative constitutional law perspective see Tsatsos (1970) and Sturm (1967).
7In some instances, the concern that parliamentarians may become beholden to a government that has ap-
pointed them to certain posts after their election has led to incompatibility rules which are extended beyond
the period of serving as a parliamentarian. Thus, a similar argument applies as is the case with revolving door
arrangements for regulators. In the United States, for example, no member of Congress may be appointed to an
administrative oﬃce that has been created or for which the salary has been granted during his or her term of
oﬃce. A similar incompatibility rule exists in the Philippines.
51883 for the ﬁrst time. In the 20th century, a third reason arose: Rules of incompatibility should
protect the independence of the parliament by preventing the legislature from being dominated
by people with public sector backgrounds and thus public service interests. The latter rationale
became the predominant argument underlying the constitutional design of the separation of
powers relating to public servants elected to parliament.
Today, almost all democracies adhering to the principle of separation of powers stipulate some
rules of incompatibility in their constitutional provisions.
In some countries, there is a movement to extend these rules of incompatibility to occupations
beyond the public sector. In France and Italy, for example, holding a parliamentary mandate is
incompatible with being a public contractor or a major supplier of public goods and services, or
being the employee of a former public enterprise. Such rules mostly apply to management staﬀ.
Furthermore, in some countries incompatibility rules also restrict lawyers from continuously
receiving mandates from public authorities, as is the case with Belgium. There are also countries
that have legislation enforcing the incompatibility of a political mandate with employment in
foreign enterprises or international organizations. This is the case in Egypt, for example. In
general, however, the incompatibility rules that address types of private sector employment
constitute exceptions.8
2.2 Selection eﬀects of incompatibility rules
The conditions under which candidates with a public service background are allowed to take oﬃce
in a legislature and the conditions they face as members of legislatures shape their incentives
to run for a parliamentary mandate.9 The relative attractiveness of such political mandates
to public servants compared to private sector candidates is reﬂected in the fraction of public
servants in parliament.10
The law may declare that parliamentary membership is incompatible with other public oﬃces.
This obliges candidates, once elected, to relinquish their public service oﬃce. If public servants
face an ineligibility rule, they are obliged to resign prior to running for the political mandate
and risk having neither a seat in the legislative assembly nor a position in the public service.
This increases the opportunity cost of running for a political mandate.
8For a general discussion of various legal aspects of a parliamentary mandate from a comparative perspective,
see van der Hulst (2000).
9An overview of candidacy requirements for legislative elections in a set of countries is provided in Massicotte
et al. (2004).
10There are numerous other reasons explaining why the incentives for self-selection into politics may diﬀer
between people from diﬀerent sectors. For example, the compensation rules for a political mandate compared to
public service pay or the organisational structure of parliament in terms of time requirements might systematically
aﬀect the composition of parliaments. Research in political economics has only recently started to analyse various
aspects related to the remuneration of a political mandate, such as outside earnings (Gagliarducci et al. 2010) or
post oﬃce returns (Diermeier et al. 2005, Eggers and Hainmueller 2009).
6In contrast to inelegibility, rules of incompatibility constitute weaker restrictions. With strict
incompatibility, all public servants have to hold their oﬃce in abeyance but may remain in oﬃce
until they are elected for a mandate; they have guaranteed reemployment (in varying degrees)
subsequent to the termination of their mandate.
With soft incompatibility, only some categories of public servants are restricted, whereas all
other public servants can continue in their public service career, often with a guaranteed re-
duced workload. Some countries conﬁne incompatibilities only to speciﬁc public oﬃces, regard-
less of the rank in the hierarchy. In other countries, the ban aﬀects only high-ranking public
servants. While strict incompatibility increases the opportunity costs for all public servants, soft
incompatibility increases costs only for some of them.
If a compatibility regime is applied, public servants elected to the legislature are free to juggle
with their job in the public sector. In most cases, they face favorable conditions in terms of pay
and time.
In sum, we expect that the stricter the incompatibility rule applied is, the higher will be the
opportunity costs for public servants running for a political mandate. Accordingly, we expect
to ﬁnd the smallest fraction of citizens with a public sector background elected to parliaments
in countries where ineligibility rules are in force.11
3 Empirical analysis for the political selection of public servants
3.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on a newly collected dataset. It captures the fraction of public
servants in 71 national parliaments for recent elections between 2000 and 2010 and the rules of
(in)compatibility applied in the respective countries.
Occupational composition of national legislatures
Primarily for single election periods, statistics are published by the Inter-Parliamentary Union
(IPU) based on information supplied by parliamentary information services. The IPU tries to
make the information comparable across countries. An example is provided for the case of the
Algerian parliament in Table A.1a in the Appendix. Statistics published by the national parlia-
mentary online services form another main data source. They ideally contain information about
11In some countries, public servants facing incompatibility restrictions are compensated with speciﬁc privileges.
Guaranteed reemployment is probably the most important one. Another privilege is the compensation for holding
the public oﬃce in abeyance. Further speciﬁc privileges are discussed in Braendle and Stutzer (2010a) for the
institutional context of the German subnational parliaments. In the current setting, we have to abstract from these
institutions owing to information costs. However, in Braendle and Stutzer (2010a), the degree of incompatibility
is the most important institutional determinant of the representation of public servants in parliament.
7the occupational composition of the respective parliament. Short curricula vitae of the individ-
ual parliamentarians are the minimum requirement. They must include suﬃcient information
about the occupations held prior to entering parliament. Based on the latter information, we
were able to code occupations in a consistent manner and to determine the occupational com-
position.
For sixty occupational statistics, we adopted the fraction of public servants in parliament from
the IPU aggregate information on the composition of parliaments. For another eleven parlia-
ments, we collected data from parliamentary online services. They either oﬀered databases or
systematic information about individual politicians’ professions. Whenever more detailed in-
formation was available on the national parliamentary service web pages, we gave it preference
over the information supplied by the IPU.12 We consider the following occupational titles as
public servants or employees of the public sector: teacher, professor, educational profession,
researcher, scientist, civil or public servant and employee of the local, state or federal authority
administration, judge, public prosecutor, employee of the judiciary, armed services or military,
police oﬃcial, social worker, and employee of a public enterprise (if indicated). For example, the
occupational statistic of the 17th German parliament (Bundestag) indicates that 199 out of 622
members (i.e., a fraction of 31.99%), have a public sector background. Of these 199 members,
86 (43.21%) hold a position in the educational and research sector. The other 113 members
hold the following functions: administration (62 members or 31.16%), judiciary (13 members
or 6.53%), municipal public servants (13 members or 6.53%), medical professions (9 members
or 4.52%), police (7 members or 3.52%), military service (3 members or 1.5%) and 3% execute
other functions in the public service. The background of the remaining 423 representatives is
described in detail in Appendix A.1b.13
On average, the fraction of public servants elected to the 71 national parliaments in our sample
is 31.41%. This number takes into account that in many statistics there is a category of parlia-
mentarians with unknown professional background. The adjusted fraction is expressed relative
to those politicians whose occupation is speciﬁed. The unadjusted or raw fraction is 29.38% in
the sample. The fraction is lowest in Singapore in 2001 with 6.49% (unadj. 5.95%) and highest
in Djibouti in 2008 with 73.85%. A complete list of the data sources and the fraction of public
servants for every country is provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
In collecting and compiling data on the fraction of public servants in parliament, we encountered
several methodological challenges. First, existing statistics on the socio-economic composition
12For the U.S., no systematic information on the occupational background of the members of congress is
available. We therefore coded information retrieved from various sources; i.e., in particular, the homepages of
individual parliamentarians and the site “votesmart.org”.
13The IPU typically reports country-speciﬁc statistics for diﬀerent occupations within the public service. We
aggregate these subcategories. However, information on the subcategories in the individual countries is available
on request.
8of parliaments diﬀer as to their intended purpose. In contrast to our study, which concentrates
on the last occupation held before election to parliament, some national statistics focus more on
educational background, or occupation learned.14, 15 Second, if the statistics did not contain one
coherent category for the public sector, we had to rearrange or to aggregate categories in order
to gain comparable data. A frequent case is separate categories for members of parliament who
are from the judicial branch, the administration, the education or the public security sector. For
some of the countries, it is not clear which professions or functions belong to or are executed
by the public service. Due to the variation in the degree of diﬀerentiation, we abstained from a
reﬁned data collection and generated aggregate data on the fraction of public servants. Countries
for which the available information did not permit an expert judgment were excluded.
Institutional conditions
Rules of incompatibility are either written down in the national constitution, the electoral law
or in one of the various laws governing the parliament, the judiciary and the public service.
We are not aware of any study that systematically compares (in)compatibility regimes across
countries. For the present study, we mainly collected and coded information provided by the
IPU. Where no information was available (or where the information was contradictory), we
looked for national provisions as far as information was available in English, German, Italian,
Spanish or French. We coded four diﬀerent types of (in)compatibility or ineligibility regimes:
Ineligibility is given if all public servants have to resign from public service when they decide to
become a candidate.
Strict incompatibility is given if all public servants have to hold their oﬃce in abeyance while in
parliament.
Soft incompatibility is given if only some categories of public servants have to hold their oﬃce
in abeyance while in parliament.
Compatibility is given if public servants elected to parliament may stay in their public service
oﬃce.
In preparation of the empirical analysis, the four regimes are coded as dummy variables. Table
A.3 in the Appendix gives an overview of the institutional conditions holding in each country
as well as the data sources.
14This is, e.g., the case for Canada, Bulgaria and Slovenia. In the case of Canada, we were able to retrieve the
correct information based on the study of individual MPs’ curricula vitae.
15When analyzing individual curricula vitae, we encountered unclear chronologies of apportionments or the
holding of multiple jobs at the same time (especially for members of the US congress).
93.2 Results
(In)compatibility regimes are expected to modify the attractiveness of a political mandate
for public servants and thus systematically aﬀect the (self-)selection of citizens with diﬀerent
professional backgrounds into national parliaments. First, raw evidence is presented in Figure 1.
It shows the fraction of public servants elected under diﬀerent (in)compatibility regimes in the
period 2000-2010. Consistent with the theoretical hypothesis, the stricter the incompatibility
rule applied is, the lower is the fraction of public servants elected to parliament. For the
compatibility regime, we observe a fraction of public servants in parliament of 38.85% on
average in the full sample. With soft incompatibility, the respective fraction is 34.35%. With
strict incompatibility or ineligibility, 28.7%, and 28.5% respectively, are observed on average. A
similar picture emerges if we restrict the sample to at least partly free democracies (according
to the Freedom House democracy rating).
[Figure 1 about here]
In order to deal with correlated and confounding factors that might drive the raw correlation,
the remainder of the empirical analysis focuses on the partial correlations from multiple regres-
sions between institutional conditions for public servants as members of parliament and their
actual representation in them. We report the results for a series of estimation speciﬁcations
in order to uncover as much information as possible about our data pool. In particular, we
test the robustness of our results including and excluding various control variables for institu-
tional and economic development. In addition, we take into account a reﬁned categorization of
(in)compatibility regimes and restrict the sample once to “at least partly free democracies” and
once to “free democracies” (according to the democracy rating published by Freedom House).
The ﬁrst set of results in Table 1 is based on the full sample of 71 countries. Panel I reports
the results of a cross-sectional ordinary least squares estimation. In correspondence with
Figure 1, a strict incompatibility or an ineligibility rule is related to a 6.6 percentage points
smaller fraction of public servants in parliament (the reference regime being compatibility or
soft incompatibility). Panel II adds the log of GDP per capita in 2005 as a control variable
for economic development. Panel III includes the Freedom House democracy rating of 2000 to
control for the development of democratic institutions in general. Both control variables show
no clear correlation with the fraction of public servants in national parliaments. The partial
correlation for the variable capturing the (in)compatibility regimes remains almost unchanged.
[Table 1 about here]
10The robustness of the partial correlations is studied in Table 2. In panels II to IV, we analyse
whether the (in)compatibility regimes are just place holders for other speciﬁc institutions (ob-
served and unobserved), which are the actual drivers of occupation-speciﬁc political selection.
Panel I repeats the baseline estimation. We concentrate on the voting system, disclosure rules
and the legal origins. The variables are described in Table A.4 in the Appendix.
In a majority voting system, public servants who aspire to a political career might be in an
advantageous position relative to competitors from the private sector. This is the case if they
have already gained some prominence due to their position in the public service or if they beneﬁt
from ﬂexible work conditions during their campaign. Accordingly, we might expect a larger
fraction of public servants to be represented in national parliaments.16 If the same countries
apply majority voting and soft incompatibility, the observed correlation in Table 1 might be
spurious. While a majority voting system is positively correlated with the fraction of public
servants in national parliaments (though not statistically signiﬁcantly), the partial correlation
for the incompatibility variable remains robust in panel II.
If politicians have to disclose the sources of their outside income, a political mandate might
become less attractive. This might, in particular, hold for public servants’ competitors from
the private sector; e.g., lawyers and businessmen. In order to control for this potentially corre-
lated institutional feature of legislatures, we include a disclosure rule index for income sources
(Djankov et al. 2010) in the regression estimation in panel III. Contrary to the reasoning above,
we ﬁnd no eﬀect. The eﬀect for the incompatibility variable is almost unchanged.
There are potentially many democratic institutions that aﬀect the (self-)selection of pub-
lic servants into national parliaments - institutions that might also be correlated with the
(in)compatibility regimes. If these institutions are part of a bundle of institutions that fol-
low a speciﬁc legal tradition, we can control for these unobserved factors by including legal
origins as control variables (La Porta et al. 2008). Panel IV reports the results. Compared to
countries with a French legal origin, countries with a Scandinavian legal origin have a sizeably
larger fraction of public servants in national parliaments (though imprecisely measured). Legal
origin, however, does not explain the negative partial correlation for strict incompatibility and
inelegibility.
In the last two panels of Table 2, we control for additional indicators of socio-economic devel-
opment. In panel V, we test whether a gender-speciﬁc selection into parliament systematically
aﬀects the professional composition. Concretely, women are often employed in various public
sector branches, such as the educational sector, public health or the social services. Thus, the
16However, if a candidacy in a majority voting system requires more resources because it is more focused on
the individual candidates (relative to the parties), public servants might be at a disadvantage relative, e.g., to
businessmen from the private sector.
11selection of women into parliaments might systematically aﬀect the representation of public ser-
vants. However, if we include the fraction of women elected into national parliaments in 2005,
we ﬁnd no corresponding empirical evidence.
In panel VI, the sectoral structure of an economy is taken into account. It might be hypothesized
that an economy with a large service sector requires more state coordination. Correspondingly,
more candidates from the public sector might be recruited for a political mandate. In our
robustness test, we ﬁnd a positive (though not statistically signiﬁcant) partial correlation
between the fraction of employment in the service sector and the fraction of public servants in
parliament. The partial correlation for the incompatibility variable remains robust.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 3 reports some further robustness checks. First, we disaggregate the incompatibility
indicator into the categories soft incompatibility, strict incompatibility and ineligibility. Panel
II reports the ﬁnding next to the result of the baseline estimation in panel I. The reference
category is now a compatibility rule. In comparison, soft incompatibility is related to a 4.8
percentage points smaller fraction of public servants in parliament. For strict incompatibility
the coeﬃcient is -10.9 percentage points, and for ineligibility the coeﬃcient is -11.2 percentage
points, respectively. The eﬀects for the reﬁned categorization, however, are statistically precisely
measured only in the case of strict incompatibility.
Second, we twice assess the robustness of our results: Once we restrict our sample to “at least
partly free democracies” (panels III and IV) and once to “free democracies” (panels V and VI)
according to the Freedom House democracy rating. We expect a stronger adherence to the rule
of law in more democratic regimes. Correspondingly, the enforcement of political institutions
in general, and of incompatibility rules in particular, is expected to be more stringent in
the restricted sample of countries. The estimations conﬁrm the negative partial correlations
between the strictness of the incompatibility rule and the representation of public servants. In
particular, we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant negative partial correlations with larger eﬀect sizes if
the sample to restricted to free democracies.
[Table 3 about here]
In sum, the diﬀerent (in)compatibility regimes are correlated with the fraction of public servants
in a statistically robust way. The ﬁndings indicate that stricter incompatibility rules increase
12the opportunity costs of a political mandate for public servants and thus systematically aﬀect
political selection into national parliaments.
4 Consequences for political outcomes
4.1 The trade-oﬀ between conﬂicts of interest and competence
We diﬀerentiate between two channels through which rules of incompatibility aﬀect political
outcomes. First, incompatibility rules explicitly prohibit the simultaneous execution of an ex-
ecutive function and a legislative mandate. This constraint reduces intrapersonal conﬂicts of
interest for public servants assuming a parliamentary seat. The incompatibility rule can thus be
considered an (ex ante) sanctioning device. Second, the same rules reduce conﬂicts of interest
through their eﬀect on political selection. As argued above, the stricter the rules in force are, the
higher will be the opportunity costs of becoming a politician for candidates with a public sector
background. If the arguments are restricted to conﬂicts of interest, we expect a more eﬃcient
provision of public goods and services with strict incompatibility either owing to its sanctioning
eﬀect, its eﬀect on political selection, or both.
However, a trade-oﬀ emerges when we take into account the aspect of expertise in political
selection. Public servants form a pool of people with ﬁrst-hand information about public service
issues and a revealed interest in these matters. If this competence pool is partly excluded from
the parliamentary process, we alternatively can expect a less eﬃcient government sector. We
brieﬂy develop these countervailing arguments related to political selection in more detail and
derive speciﬁc testable hypotheses.
The concern for conﬂicts of interest rests on the personal union and aﬃliations between the
legislative and executive body as well as the perk of guaranteed reemployment. In particular,
the private interests of public servants might lead to slack that is less forcefully counteracted by
committees that are largely composed of public servants. A case in point is their involvement in
drafting and revising civil service law. Moreover, public servants are likely to have an information
advantage with regard to legislative procedures. This allows for more leeway to manoeuvre,
especially in areas they are professionally acquainted with such as administration, security,
public ﬁnance or education.17 As proponents and representatives of the public service, they
17This is not to say, that other members of parliament would not also pursue their own goals (and thus
experience conﬂicts of interest). However, the authority of the legislature with regard to the duties of the public
sector and the conditions governing public service are more concrete and immediate than for the private sector.
Many aspects are more explicitly and more comprehensively regulated than in any other regulated market. While
there are speciﬁc ordinances, e.g., regulating the business of pharmacies or the fees of attorneys, there are a
multitude of laws and ordinances regulating the public service such as its internal training, pay, pension scheme
and legal status.
13may also favor policy choices that grant more competencies to the state and provide more
services through the public sector, resulting in a larger government sector. In sum, a strong
representation of public servants in parliament is expected to result in a large government sector
and fewer countermeasures against misbehavior in the public service; e.g., in terms of corruption.
The competence argument emphasizes that politics is not simply a platform for the exchange
of private interests. The expert knowledge possessed by public servants rather contributes to
productive policy choices in parliament. Public servants in parliament might also aﬀect political
outcomes simply due to their ties with the state. The vocation of a career in the public service
might reﬂect particular loyalty to an organization set up to provide public services. Given
that public servants enjoy institutional privileges, such as reemployment guarantees and often
favorable terms for leave of absence, they might be considered relatively independent of outside
pressure and free to dedicate themselves to parliamentary duties until the end of their mandate.
These aspects of the representation of public servants in parliament are particularly attractive
if the information asymmetry between the executive and the legislative branch is severe (as
stressed by Niskanen 1971). Electing insiders to parliament who become accountable to the
electorate might consequently help to align interests between principals and agents. One eﬀect
might be stricter parliamentary oversight, since public servants face lower control costs due to
their experience and information advantage (for a detailed discussion see Braendle and Stutzer
2010b). The increased oversight activity induces the government and its subordinate public
service to provide public goods and services more eﬃciently. According to this line of reasoning,
public servants as legislators have a positive impact on the execution of sovereign authority,
which also includes the reduction of its abuse by means of parliamentary control. A stronger
representation of public servants in parliament is thus expected to reduce corruption and also
the waste of public funds.
Overall, the net eﬀect of incompatibility rules and the actual representation of public servants in
legislative assemblies on political outcomes is theoretically undetermined and invites an empirical
investigation.
4.2 Empirical analysis
Following the theoretical reasoning, we analyse the statistical relationship between the represen-
tation of public servants in parliament and two broad measures of political outcomes: perceived
corruption and government consumption. The indicators are described in Table A.4 in the Ap-
pendix. We present diﬀerent estimation speciﬁcations for both outcome measures, including two
which are based on an instrumental variable approach.
In Table 4, we look at the partial correlations between the political selection of public servants as
14well as the incompatibility rule and the absence of corruption based on an index from Kaufmann
et al. (2008). This index synthesizes a rich base of data capturing the phenomenon of corruption.
In panel I, we study the partial correlation between a strict incompatibility regime and absence
of corruption, controlling for the log of GDP per capita and the Freedom House democracy
rating. While no statistically signiﬁcant correlation for the incompatibility variable is observed,
economic development and democracy are related to less perceived corruption.
Panel II emphasizes the partial correlation between the representation of public servants in
parliament and the absence of corruption. We ﬁnd that a larger fraction is related to less
corruption. A 10 percentage-points higher fraction of public servants is statistically signiﬁcantly
related to a 0.09 point increase in the index for absence of corruption.
In order to test the robustness of the partial correlation, the estimation in panel III includes the
legal origin of a country’s legal system and the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of
GDP. The latter variable serves as a proxy for the extent of openness to foreign competition.
In addition to income per capita and democracy, the legal origins as well as the openness to
trade are important predictors in previous work on corruption (see, e.g., La Porta et al. 2008,
Treisman 2007, Persson and Tabellini 2005, and Serra 2006). We ﬁnd that the fraction of
public servants in parliament remains statistically signiﬁcantly associated with less perceived
corruption. The coeﬃcients of the control variables are consistent with prior results in empirical
research. Together, the factors account for 86.6% of the variation in the dependent variable.
While we consider this latter correlation interesting as such, it might well be the result of
a causal relationship running from perceived corruption to political selection rather than
the direction analysed in the theoretical part. In particular, candidates from the public
sector might get more electoral support in a relatively less corrupt political system. In this
constellation, a two-stage estimation approach is recommended in order to further explore
the relationship between political selection and corruption. However, we are not aware of an
adequate instrument with which to perform our preferred analysis separating the selection from
the accountability channel discussed in Section 4.1. Instead, based on the observation that
there is no independent correlation between the incompatibility rule and perceived corruption,
we take the variable covering a strict incompatibility or an inelegibility regime as an instrument.
We do this assuming that there is no direct institutional eﬀect on corruption. The eﬀect is
rather indirect. As analysed in the Sections 2 and 3, the incompatibility regime is theoretically
and empirically a strong predictor of the representation of public servants in parliament. In
addition, in most countries, the incompatibility of a public service oﬃce with a parliamentary
mandate is included in the earliest constitutional provisions and can thus be considered a
long-standing institution that is basically unrelated to current political outcomes. Panels IV
and V report the results of the second stage of the two-stage least squares estimation. If we
15only exploit the variation in the representation of public servants that is due to the strict
incompatibility or the ineligibility regime, we still observe a positive correlation with the absence
of corruption with a point estimate of similar magnitude. However, based on the IV-estimation,
it cannot be rejected that there is no eﬀect of the representation of public servants on corruption.
[Table 4 about here]
Table 5 reports the results for general government ﬁnal consumption as a share of GDP. Current
theories of the size of government concentrate on factors aﬀecting the long-run equilibrium of
the supply and demand for public goods and services. We take the average over the years 2000
to 2008 in order to smooth out short-run shocks to the supply and demand for public goods. We
proceed as before and take some major determinants of government consumption into account.
Panel I includes a dummy for strict incompatibility or ineligibility in addition to the log of GDP
per capita and the democracy rating. The institutional restriction is negatively correlated with
government consumption. Panel II adds the adjusted fraction of public servants. This variable
is strongly and statistically signiﬁcantly positively correlated with government consumption.
In countries with a 10 percentage points higher representation of public servants, government
consumption is roughly 2 percentage points higher. This correlation holds in panel III if we
include four further predictors of the size of government: openness to trade, two demographic
variables capturing the fraction of the population under 15 and over 65 years of age, and an
indicator of ethnic fractionalization. The four variables have been identiﬁed as basic variables
in empirical research on government size (see, e.g., Shelton 2007).
Obviously, a larger government also oﬀers a larger pool of political candidates and more voters
potentially favoring candidates with a public service background. The partial correlation for
the fraction of public servants might thus reﬂect eﬀects in both directions. Here, we again
apply an instrumental variable approach in order to explore the eﬀects of the representation
of public servants in parliament. In panels IV and V, we exploit the variation that is due
to the variable covering a strict incompatibility or an inelegibility regime. A positive eﬀect
is estimated. However, the standard error for the point estimation is too large to draw ﬁrm
statistical conclusions.
In sum, the phenomenon of a strong representation of public servants in parliament is correlated
with the absence of corruption and more government consumption in a statistically robust way.
However, instrumental variable estimations do not so far allow us to identify causal eﬀects in
either direction between the variables.
[Table 5 about here]
165 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we adopt a more person-centered view of the political process. We argue that
the individual characteristics of politicians matter for public policy choices and government out-
comes. This contrasts with the reasoning of many political philosophers and political economists
that good governance is (solely) the result of institutions which allow that politicians are held
accountable for their behavior. According to this latter view, it is useless to call for more
competent and honest politicians in order to remedy malfunctions such as corrupt behavior.
Obviously, the two views are not mutually exclusive. As political control and the credibility
of policy commitments are always limited, a careful selection of representatives is important to
bring the outcomes of the political process closer in line with citizens’ preferences when delegating
decision-making power. We think that a comparative institutional analysis of political selection
bridges the two views and emphasizes questions that have been neglected so far in political
economics. First, which are the institutions systematically aﬀecting political selection; i.e., the
composition of the pool of politicians with regard to identity or quality characteristics? Second,
are there consequences for political outcomes stemming from institutions that are primarily set
up with the intention of holding politicians accountable? On the one hand, institutions which
focus on reducing agency problems might not only tame the potential misbehavior of politicians
in oﬃce, but also deter some citizens from entering politics in the ﬁrst place; for instance, those
citizens who seek to abuse their political power for private interests. Some outcome observations
from the political process that are attributed to accountability mechanisms might thus, in fact,
be due to political selection. On the other hand, an emphasis on control mechanisms could also
backﬁre if it systematically changes the pool of candidates for the worse.
The incompatibility of a public sector position with a political mandate is one such institution.
It is introduced in various forms to prevent conﬂicts of interest and thus to reduce agency
problems. We have argued that this institution might also systematically change the pool of
available candidates and elected politicians because a strict incompatibility regime increases
the opportunity costs incurred by public servants when pursuing political mandates. Our main
analysis is consistent with this hypothesis. We ﬁnd in a cross-country analysis based on a novel
dataset that, on average, there are 7 percentage points fewer public servants in parliaments in
which a strict incompatibility or an ineligibility regime is applied.
In an explorative study on the consequences for political outcomes, the fraction of public servants
in parliament was found to be positively related to government consumption and the absence of
corruption.
Future reseach will have to show whether these relationships can be interpreted as causal and
identify any other consequences for politics that the selection of public servants into politics
17may have. These complementary insights are indispensable for a comprehensive understanding
of (in)compatibility rules and will provide evidence supporting constitutional decisions on how
to develop and implement legislation on the separation of powers.
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compatibility soft incompatibility strict incompatibility inelegibility
Regime
full sample restricted sample
Notes: Information for 71 countries within the period 2000-2010 is included for the full sample.
59 countries are included in the sample restricted to “at least partly free democracies” according
to the Freedom House democracy rating.
Sources: Own calculations based on IPU and national parliamentary data services.
22Table 1: Determinants of the representation of public servants in national parliaments
Dependent variable: Adjusted fraction of public servants (%)
I II III
Strict incompatibility or inelegibility –6.607** –7.293** –7.136**
(3.18) (3.13) (3.15)




No. of obs. 71 71 71
R2 .059 .113 .120
Prob.>F 0.041 0.017 0.035
Notes: OLS estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. Adjustment of the dependent variable
due to the category “unknown professions”.
Signiﬁcance levels: * .05 <p<. 1, ** .01 <p<. 05, ***p<. 01.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Table 4: Representation of public servants and absence of corruption
Dependent variable: Kaufmann corruption index
I II III IV V
Strict incompatibility or inelegibility –0.074 –0.006 0.010
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Adjusted fraction of public servants 0.009** 0.008* 0.010 0.006
(0.4e-3) (0.4e-3) (0.01) (0.02)
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.445*** 0.452*** 0.414*** 0.453*** 0.413***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Democracy rating 0.164*** 0.173*** 0.169*** 0.174*** 0.168***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
UK legal origin 0.318** 0.316**
(0.14) (0.14)
German legal origin 0.120 0.116
(0.17) (0.17)
Scandinavian legal origin 0.688** 0.703*
(0.29) (0.37)
Trade (% of GDP) 0.002* 0.002
(0.00) (0.00)
N o . o f o b s . 7 0 7 0 6 67 06 6
R2 .823 .833 .866 .833 .866
Prob.>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Panels I to III are OLS estimations. Panels IV and V are TSLS estimations. Standard
errors in parentheses. The fraction of public servants is instrumented by the variable capturing
a strict incompatibility or an inelegibility regime. The dependent variable is the average score
of the Kaufmann corruption index for the years 2003, 2005 and 2007. The reference category
in the panels III and IV is “French legal origin”.
Signiﬁcance levels: * .05 <p<. 1, ** .01 <p<. 05, *** p<. 01.
Sources: See Tables A.2-A.4.
26Table 5: Representation of public servants and government size
Dependent variable: Government ﬁnal consumption expenditure (% of GDP)
I II III IV V
Strict incompatibility or inelegibility –1.428 0.231 0.404
(1.27) (1.11) (1.13)
Adjusted fraction of public servants 0.215*** 0.230*** 0.185 0.176
(0.04) (0.04) (0.14) (0.15)
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.477 0.608 0.160 0.590 0.257
(0.51) (0.42) (0.56) (0.42) (0.64)
Democracy Rating 0.453 0.657 0.280 0.629 0.255
(0.49) (0.41) (0.45) (0.43) (0.47)
Trade (% of GDP) –0.000 –0.001
(0.01) (0.01)
Population under 15 years (%) 0.069 0.105
(0.13) (0.16)
Population over 65 years (%) 0.461* 0.469*
(0.24) (0.24)
Ethnic fractionalization –0.158 –0.278
(2.57) (2.55)
No. of obs. 65 65 62 65 62
R2 .100 .384 .453 .378 .437
Prob.>F/Chi2 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.051
Notes: Panels I to III are OLS estimations. Panels IV and V are TSLS estimations. Standard
errors in parentheses. The fraction of public servants is instrumented by the variable capturing
a strict incompatibility or an inelegibility regime. The dependent variable is the average of the
government ﬁnal consumption expenditure for the years 2000 to 2008.
Signiﬁcance levels: * .05 <p<. 1, ** .01 <p<. 05, *** p<. 01.
Sources: See Tables A.2-A.4.
27Appendix
Table A.1a: Occupational composition of the Algerian Parliament in 2007
# Fraction
Public sector
Public servants and public administrators 131 0.3368
Educators 56 0.1440
Military and police oﬃcers 3 0.0077
Scientists and researchers 1 0.0026
Total 191 0.4910
Other sectors
Legal professions 30 0.0771
Medical professions (doctors, dentists, nurses) 20 0.0514
Liberal professions (including artists, authors) and sport professionals 37 0.0951
Consultants (including real estate agents) 13 0.0334
Business, trade, and industry employees, including executives 12 0.0308
Bankers (including investment bankers) and accountants 7 0.0180
Media-related professions (journalists and publishers) 2 0.0051









Notes: The category “public servants” and “public administrators” includes social and
development workers.
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (2007).




1.1 Public service (public servants and employees in the public service)




Municipal public servants 13 0.0209
Educational professions and researchers 86 0.1383
Medical professions 9 0.0145
Others 6 0.0096
Total 199 0.3199
1.2 Professions related to political activities
Employees of parties 36 0.0579
Employees of trade unions 24 0.0386
Former employees of parliamentarians 14 0.0225
Others 16 0.0257
Total 90 0.1447
1.3 Private sector employees including employees of
professional associations
Employees in artisanry, manufacturing, industry, sales and services 54 0.0868
Agricultural workers 1 0.0016
Employees in ﬁnancial sector 6 0.0096
Insurance employees 2 0.0032





Legal professions 102 0.1640
Medical professions 4 0.0064
Media-related professions 21 0.0338
Liberal technical professions 4 0.0064
Other liberal professions 7 0.0113
Total 138 0.2219
– continued on next page –
29Table A.1b – continued
2.2 Other self-employed
Self-employed in artisanry, manufacturing, industry, sales and services 32 0.0514
Farmers 11 0.0177





Students or in apprenticeship 8 0.0129
Clerical professions 6 0.0096
Total 16 0.0257
4. Unknown 33 0.0531
Total 622 1
Source: German parliamentary online service.
30Table A.2: Data sources and descriptive statistics for the fraction of public servants in national
parliaments
Country Year of election Fraction of public servants in %
Adjusted Unadjusted
Own coding based on national parliamentary statistics
Albania 2001 24.42 22.14
Austria 2008 33.88 33.88
Germany 2009 33.78 31.99
Italy 2008 19.97 19.97
United Kingdom 2005 22.76 22.76
Own coding based on the national parliamentary online data bases containing detailed
and systematic individual information
Canada 2006 19.87 19.87
Finland 2008 46.49 43.00
Ireland 2007 31.55 31.55
Netherlands 2010 32.39 30.67
Own coding based on the individual MP’s webpage (without systematic information)
United States of America 2008 33.10 32.65
Own coding based on Inter-Parliamentary Union statistics for national parliaments
Algeria 2007 54.88 49.10
Andorra 2005 19.23 17.86
Argentina 2007 18.69 16.86
Armenia 2007 17.56 17.56
Australia 2004 18.00 18.00
Azerbaijan 2005 27.44 26.96
Belgium 2007 25.18 24.00
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002 9.52 9.52
Bulgaria 2005 20.26 18.08
Burkina Faso 2002 45.05 45.05
Burundi 2005 48.31 48.31
Central African Republic 2005 44.66 43.81
Chile 2009 20.83 20.83
Cyprus 2006 21.82 21.43
Denmark 2007 53.99 49.16
Djibouti 2008 73.85 73.85
Dominica 2005 28.58 25.81
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2007 26.16 24.61
Estonia 2007 41.23 39.60
France 2007 34.34 29.64
Gambia 2002 48.08 47.17
Greece 2007 18.67 18.67
– continued on next page –
31Table A.2 – continued
Haiti 2006 31.03 27.55
Hungary 2006 26.63 25.39
Indonesia 2004 9.58 9.27
Latvia 2006 45.00 45.00
Lebanon 2009 34.38 34.38
Liechtenstein 2005 20.00 20.00
Luxembourg 2004 43.33 43.33
Macedonia, FYR 2008 26.41 23.33
Mali 2007 42.23 38.78
Republic of Moldova 2005 25.00 23.76
Monaco 2008 15.00 12.50
Mongolia 2008 21.33 21.33
New Zealand 2008 41.66 40.98
Niger 2004 29.20 29.20
Norway 2005 26.74 24.08
Peru 2001 16.66 15.83
Philippines 2001 16.04 15.89
Poland 2007 38.91 38.91
Portugal 2005 39.11 38.26
Romania 2008 14.97 14.97
Samoa 2006 20.41 20.41
Senegal 2001 31.67 31.67
Serbia 2007 24.89 22.00
Singapore 2001 6.49 5.95
Slovak Republic 2006 29.58 28.00
Solomon Islands 2006 58.00 58.00
Suriname 2005 60.41 56.86
Switzerland 2007 22.16 20.50
Syrian Arab Republic 2007 35.54 34.40
Tajikistan 2005 33.33 33.33
Thailand 2007 12.76 11.88
Tunisia 2009 52.34 52.34
Turkey 2007 30.42 27.27
Uganda 2006 36.97 31.63
Notes: For Belarus, we report the professional composition for the 80 newly elected parliamen-
tarians (out of 110 parliamentarians).
In Dominica, 9 out of 31 members of parliament are directly appointed by the head of state.
32Table A.3 Incompatibility regimes in nations in 2010
Country Regime Source
Albania Compatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Algeria Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Andorra Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Argentina Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Armenia Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Australia Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Austria Soft incompatibility Austrian Constitution Article
59
Azerbaijan Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Belarus Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Belgium Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Bosnia and Herzegovina Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Bulgaria Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Burkina Faso Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Burundi Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Canada Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Central African Republic Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Chile Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Congo, Rep. Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Cyprus Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Denmark Compatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Djibouti Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Dominica Compatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Egypt, Arab Republic Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Estonia Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Finland Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
France Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Gambia Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Germany Strict incompatibility German Constitution Article
137 and the Law for the mem-
bers of the German parlia-
ment
Greece Ineligibility Hellenic Constitution Articles
55-57
Haiti Ineligibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Hungary Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Indonesia Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Ireland Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Israel Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Italy Strict incompatibility Electoral Law Article 88
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Kuwait Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Latvia Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Lebanon Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Liechtenstein Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Luxembourg Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Macedonia, FYR Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Mali Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Moldova Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Monaco Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Mongolia Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Netherlands Compatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
New Zealand Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Niger Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Nigeria Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Norway Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Peru Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Philippines Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Poland Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Portugal Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Romania Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Samoa Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Senegal Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Serbia Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Singapore Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Slovak Republic Soft incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Solomon Islands Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Suriname Compatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Switzerland Soft incompatibility Law for the National Parlia-
ment Article 14
Syrian Arab Republic Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Tajikistan Compatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Thailand Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Tunisia Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Turkey Strict incompatibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Uganda Ineligibility Uganda Constitution Articles
77-82
United Kingdom Ineligibility House of Commons Disquali-
ﬁcation Act
United States Ineligibility Inter-Parliamentary Union
Notes: Some countries apply speciﬁc incompatibility rules that complement the general rules
considered in the coding which go beyond the public sector.
Persons holding posts for foreign states or for international organizations are incompatible with
34a parliamentary mandate. This is the case in Burundi, Egypt, Moldova, Niger and Serbia.
Government contractors are incompatible with a parliamentary mandate in Chile, Haiti,
Philippines and Thailand.
Australia: Persons with any ﬁnancial interest in an agreement with the government are declared
incompatible unless the responsible parliamentary commission declares the position to be
compatible.
Austria: Executives of joint stock companies, banking, commercial, transport and industrial
private limited companies, provincial credit institutes and mutual insurance companies are
incompatible with a parliamentary mandate unless the responsible parliamentary commission
declares the position to be compatible.
Belgium: Lawyers continuously receiving mandates from public authorities are incompatible
with a parliamentary mandate.
Dominica: Certain government contractors are incompatible with a parliamentary mandate.
France: Further incompatible oﬃces are 1) posts attributed and remunerated by a foreign state
or an international organization and with some exceptions 2) managers or directors of ﬁrms i)
beneﬁtting from state or local government administration subsidies ii) working principally for
or under the control of the state iii) entitled to public savings and iv) involved in real estate.
Greece: The ineligibility rule does not apply to university professors. Furthermore, incompatible
with a parliamentary mandate are members of a board of directors, general managers, their
alternates, or employees of commercial companies or enterprises enjoying special privileges or
subsidies by the state.
Italy: The highest ranked senior oﬃcials in various branches of the public sector and mayors
of towns with more than 20,000 inhabitants face ineligibility rules, whereas all other public
servants face strict incompatibility. Moreover, government contractors are incompatible with a
parliamentary mandate.
Netherlands: Employees of the national parliament as well as public servants of the national
public audit institution face an incompatibility rule.
Portugal: Persons holding posts for foreign states or international organizations as well as
members of the board of directors of companies in which the state is the majority shareholder
are incompatible with a parliamentary mandate.
Senegal: Persons holding posts for international organizations as well as government contractors
are incompatible with a parliamentary mandate.
Syrian Arab Republic: Government commissioners and police oﬃcers can be elected in another
constituency than the one where they are working (after obtaining an authorization).
Tunisia: Persons holding posts for international organizations are incompatible with a parlia-
mentary mandate.
Uganda: Traditional and cultural leaders also face ineligibility.
Unites Kingdom: Educational professions are excluded from the general ineligibility rule applied.
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Variable Description
Control variables
Ln(GDP per capita) Natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 2005 converted to
international dollars using purchasing power parity rates.
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank).
Trade (% of GDP) Sum of exports and imports of goods and services mea-
sured as a share of gross domestic product in 2005.
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank).
Employment in services sector
(%)
Services sector expressed as a percentage of total employ-
ment within the period 2003-2006. The sectors of eco-
nomic activity are deﬁned according to the International
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation of All Economic Ac-
tivities (ISIC), Revision 2 (1968) and Revision 3 (1990).
Source: International Labor Organization.
Democracy rating The Freedom House democracy rating summarizes the
current state of political rights and civil liberties. On
a scale from 1 to 7, a rating of 1 indicates the high-
est degree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom.
We inverted the rating for the year 2000 in order to al-
low an intuitive interpretation of the results. Moreover,
each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings in
2000 is averaged to determine an overall status of “free”,
“partly free” or “not free”. Countries with averages be-
tween 1.0 and 2.5 are considered free, between 3.0 and
5.0 partly free, and between 5.5 and 7.0 not free. Source:
www.freedomhouse.org.
Disclosure rule index The variable for disclosure is based on the index of sources
publicly available out of the disclosure rule indexes con-
structed by Djankov et al. (2010). The index measures
the ratio of all the source items contained in the coun-
try’s disclosure form available to the public over all the
source items potentially disclosed in the artiﬁcial univer-
sal form. It measures how many conceivable disclosures
of source items are publicly available in practice. The
range of the variable is between 0 (no disclosure) and 1
(full disclosure). Source: Djankov et al. (2010).
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Legal origin Legal origin of the company law or commercial law of each
country. Each dummy variable is equal to 1 if the origin
of the law of the country is French, German, English, or
Scandinavian, respectively, and zero otherwise. Source:
La Porta et al. (2008).
Majority voting system The dummy variable for majority voting systems equals
1 if all the members of the lower house are elected under
plurality rule, 0 otherwise. Source: Norris (2009).
Women in parliament (%) The fraction of seats in national legislatures going to
women in 2005. Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union.
Population over 65 years (%) People aged 65 years and older as a percentage of the
total population in 2005. Source: World Development
Indicators (World Bank).
Population under 15 years (%) People aged 15 years and younger as a percentage of the
total population in 2005. Source: World Development
Indicators (World Bank).
Ethnic fractionalization The index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, approxi-
mates the absence of ethnic and linguistic cohesion within
a country, ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 (strongly
fractionalized) and averaging 5 diﬀerent indexes. Source:
Alesina et al. (2003).
Outcome variables
Government ﬁnal consumption
expenditure (% of GDP)
Average value for the years 2000-2008. General gov-
ernment ﬁnal consumption expenditure (formerly gen-
eral government consumption) includes all government
current expenditures for purchases of goods and services
(including compensation of employees). It also includes
most expenditures on national defense and security, but
excludes government military expenditures that are part
of government capital formation. Source: World Devel-
opment Indicators (World Bank).
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Kaufmann corruption index Average score of the Kaufmann corruption index for the
years 2003, 2005 and 2007. Perceived control of corrup-
tion captures the extent to which public power is exer-
cised for private gain, including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as ”capture” of the state by
elites and private interests. The index is one of the com-
posite measures of governance generated by the UCM. It
is in units of a standard normal distribution with mean
zero, a standard deviation of one, and running from ap-
proximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding
to better governance; i.e., less corruption. Source: Kauf-
mann et al. (2008).
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